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This is reflected in falling end-consumer prices, the declining share of the former
incumbents in total market volume and numerous new communication lines set up
by new market players.
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 	 Service competition
hinges directly on the price charged for access to communication infrastructure. As
long as there are no alternatives, though, regulatory interventions will remain
necessary at regular intervals for both infrastructure and services. Policymakers
must therefore link promotion of service competition with promotion of infra-
structure competition in order to ultimately achieve liberalisation of the telecom-
munications market.
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  Owing to
the cross-border effects of the telecom business, regulation geared to national
borders alone does not go far enough. Supranational coordination of regulation is
therefore necessary. This, however, does not require any new central authority.
Instead, existing coordinating bodies could assume a greater degree of responsi-
bility.
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   Competition in the telecom-
munications industry relies on regulation which follows a clear line in both
institutional terms (centralised or decentralised) and time frame (ex post or ex
ante). Politically motivated delays and ensuing uncertainties in the market must be
avoided if innovation is to make noticeable advances.
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As formulated in the Lisbon Agenda of 2000, the European Union
has set its sights on becoming the world’s most competitive know-
ledge-based economy by 2010. Whether this ambitious target can
be met will be partly decided by the performance capacity of the
cross-sectional technology telecommunication. For telecom-
munication impacts through a variety of direct and indirect mecha-
nisms on a country’s innovation performance, productivity and
attractiveness in the international competition for investment. This
means that broadband1 communication technologies play an
important role. As broadband supply improves, numerous production
processes increase in efficiency. Furthermore, an extensive broad-
band network paves the way for companies to enter new markets
(see figure 1).
Since the introduction of sector-specific regulation in the tele-
communications industry, telephone customers in the EU are meant
to have the possibility of choosing from a variety of alternative
providers, access technologies and services. In fact, though, in
many countries the alternatives to the services and infrastructure
offered by the former incumbent have spread more slowly than
originally expected. The former incumbents still play a prominent
role in telecommunications activities. Sector-specific regulation has
so far failed miserably to achieve the degree of competition between
telecom providers targeted when the market was opened in 1998.
Therefore, regulatory intervention in the telecommunications sector
is still necessary today at regular intervals.
This report addresses the issue of the best form of regulation in
terms of institution and time frame. In this context we describe the
development of the German telecommunications market on the
basis of several parameters. Our comparison with countries pur-
suing a differing regulatory approach is of particular interest here.
Subsequently, we will discuss the current proposals for better
regulation. At this time we will dissect the arguments favouring a
centralised regulatory authority in the EU and the instrument of ex-
ante regulation2 (see figure 2).
Rocky road, but still impressive
Matthias Kurth, the president of the Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA,
Germany’s Federal Network Agency), once said the road to more
competition was “long and bumpy”. Current statistics show that
since the introduction of sector-specific regulation competition in the
European telecommunications industry has intensified noticeably.
End-consumer prices and market splintering document the changes.
With the growing intensity of competition, end-consumer prices have
fallen by a total of 28% since 1998; telephone services in the fixed-
line network alone are down 22%. During this period, charges for
fixed-line local calls fell 2%, long-distance calls within Germany 55%
and international calls 60%, while national mobile fees declined by
37% in total. In the less competitive market for end-consumer lines,
though, prices have risen by 19% since 1998.
1 According to the currently valid convention, broadband means all transmission
technologies with a data transfer rate of over 128 kbit/s. However, this convention
is increasingly coming under fire. For broadband always has to be considered in
relation to the state of technology. This means that as technical transfer rates grow
higher, so do the basic expectations on broadband technology.
2 Ex-ante regulation means that the competent authority sets the specific values of
the relevant market parameters (especially prices) in advance. In ex-post
regulation, by contrast, the competent authority refrains from setting such targets
and relies instead on the monitoring of misuse after it has been established.
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Liberalisation started overseas
The US, the UK and Japan pressed ahead with the liberalisation of the telecom-
munications market back in the mid-1980s, while Germany did not venture to
launch its first reform until 1989. However, Germany did not take the decisive steps
until three following reforms in the middle of the 1990s.
— The first Postal Reform of 1989 separated the business aspects from the
sovereign mandate. The successor companies to Deutsche Bundespost (DBP)
took over the three areas of postal services, postal bank and telecom-
munications. These measures only constituted the beginning of a reform
process, though. The direct government influence and the monopoly on net-
work and services remained in place.
— The second Postal Reform of 1994 targeted the privatisation of the companies.
Articles 87 f and 143 b came into force in January 1995 in the framework of an
amendment to the Basic Law. Telecommunications is no longer considered to
fall under sovereign functions. The reform paved the way towards changing the
previously split (three) corporate divisions into the public limited companies
Deutsche Telekom AG, Deutsche Post AG and Deutsche Postbank AG.
— The third Postal Reform of 1996 responded to the EU requirements with the
Telecommunications Act (TKG). The enactment of the TKG in 1998 ended the
monopoly on network operation and services legally guaranteed for over a
century.
At the start of liberalisation in 1998 the German government established the
Regulatory Authority for Telecommunications and Posts (RegTP). This agency
assumed responsibility for the new job of sector-specific regulation. As part of the
expansion of the scope of duties to include the network industries electricity, gas
and railways, the RegTP has been known since July 2005 as the Bundesnetz-
agentur (BNetzA).
These differences in the development of the various market seg-
ments emerge even more clearly in a longer-term comparison. Since
1995, end-consumer prices for long-distance domestic calls in the
fixed-line network have fallen by 61% and for international calls by
68%, while for national mobile telephony they are down by a total of
61%. By contrast, the price of an end-consumer line has risen by
31%, and the price of a local call by 15%.
Competitors making up ground
No less impressive than the price declines is the competition on
turnover, communication lines (e.g. telephone channels, subscriber
lines) and connection times. With sector-specific regulation, the new
service providers were able to grab sizeable market shares from the
former incumbent. For instance, in 2007 the roughly 100 competitors
combined generated a total turnover of EUR 33 bn and thus more
than Deutsche Telekom AG (EUR 30 bn) (see figures 3 and 4). 
On the score of telephone channels (analogue line, ISDN line),
roughly 96% were held by Deutsche Telekom AG in 2002; the
reading in 2007 was down to only 76%. Besides, Deutsche Telekom
AG set up only 950,000 subscriber lines for its competitors in 2002,
while the reading was over 6 million in 2007, so the total was 5.5
times higher than before. Furthermore, since 1998 the volume of
connection times in the fixed-line network has increased by 27%,
with the bulk of this increase attributable to the competitors of
Deutsche Telekom AG. Today, Deutsche Telekom AG claims only
45% of the total connection times in the fixed-line network. On
international calls, Deutsche Telekom AG has a share of 25%, on
domestic calls 55%.
Unlike the fixed-line segment, Deutsche Telekom AG was the sole
provider in the mobile telephony segment for only a short time. As
early as 1990, no less than 8 years before the fixed-line starting
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date, competition was introduced in this budding segment with the
granting of the D2 licence in the digital mobile telephony standard
Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM). Today, four
companies hold transmission licences. The newcomers were quick
to snap up market share. At the end of 2007 Deutsche Telekom AG
and its T-Mobile subsidiary claimed only 38% of the over 96 million
mobile lines.
The statistics document the increasing telecoms competition, but
there is still a long way to go before competition can get by without
regulatory intervention at regular intervals. When looking at the data
though it has to be borne in mind that these are average values for
Germany as a whole. The pronounced regional differences in the
telecommunications market are not reflected here. In fact, competi-
tion has already made much greater advances in some of the urban
agglomerations. In Hamburg, Cologne, Munich and Oldenburg, for
instance, regionally based companies already outrank Deutsche
Telekom AG.
Other regulatory approaches also harbour risks
Two examples of regulatory policy constantly cited at the inter-
national level are the US and Swiss models, which pursue funda-
mentally different approaches. Unlike the EU, which focuses on ex-
ante regulation, these two countries increasingly rely on ex-post
regulation. A comparison shows that the US and Switzerland have,
on the one hand, achieved intensive competition at the infrastructure
level between xDSL and TV coaxial cable (see figures 7 and 9). On
the other hand, though, competition at the services level is less
pronounced in these two countries than in the EU. The regulators in
the US and Switzerland turn the EU investment ladder model (see
box on following page) upside down and expect infrastructure
competition ultimately to always drive service competition, too.
Owing to the strong emphasis on ex-post regulation and infra-
structure competition, the approach of the US and Switzerland
harbours the risk that the existing market clout in services might
become more firmly entrenched and thus result in less investment in
the medium term than in the competitive situation.3
This suggests that the US and the Swiss approach is not the
prototype of optimum regulatory practice. Compared with the EU
approach, the model of these two countries lacks the explicit criteria,
for instance, that make the necessity of regulatory intervention
verifiable.
An international comparison shows that the models of all countries
have inherent weaknesses. The comparisons should therefore not
be understood as an international championship with one winner
and many losers. Instead, it is key that one country learns from the
experiences of others. For the time being, the prerequisite for
optimum regulation is a constantly learning regulator.
3 Marcus, Scott J. (2005). Is the U.S. Dancing to a Different Drummer? In
Communications & Strategies No. 60.
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Investment ladder model describes the transition from service
competition to infrastructure competition
The investment ladder model, which is at the core of EU regulation, outlines the
time dimension of regulation. The model describes how a service provider is
virtually compelled to become an infrastructure provider over time. The investment
ladder model assumes that the new service provider initially uses the existing
infrastructure of the former incumbent. To better tailor its product range to its own
clientele, the service provider will in the course of time want to loosen the ties to
the (technical and business) targets of the established infrastructure provider. This
is why the service provider will invest part of its revenues to build up its own infra-
structure, expand its business model to include infrastructure operations and thus
compete also in this new field with the former incumbent.
VDSL paves the way to age of
fibre-optic communication
In many countries, VDSL (Very High Bitrate
Digital Subscriber Line) is a big investment
and innovation project in the telecom-
munications industry. The currently common
technologies of ADSL (Asymmetric Digital
Subscriber Line) and SDSL (Symmetric Digital
Subscriber Line) are based on copper lines
which allow downstream bandwidths of 24
MBit/s at the maximum. With VDSL, fibre-optic
lines replace the copper lines between the
main distribution frame (MDF) and the street
cabinets (SCs) where the subscriber lines
branch off. This largely fibre-optic-based
broadband network enables data transfer
rates of up to 50 Mbit/s.
Need for promotion of services and infrastructure
According to the EU’s investment ladder model, service competition
leads in the medium term (in the areas of voice and data telephony)
to infrastructure competition (e.g. having a choice between xDSL
and TV coaxial cable). Therefore, regulation should pursue a
strategy that promotes competition in both services and infra-
structure at the same time.
The difficulty of performing this balancing act is shown by the still
smouldering conflict between the European Commission and the
German government. The conflict centres on Section 9a of
Germany’s amended Telecommunications Act (TKG). If competition
is not at risk “in the long term”, Section 9a of the TKG provides that
“new” or “newly developing markets” be excluded for a limited period
from sector-specific ex-ante regulation.4 The German government
hopes that attaching such strings to regulation will strengthen the
innovation stimuli in the telecommunications industry.
Conflict has deeper roots
However, the conflict over the conditions attached to the regulation
of new markets as anchored in Germany’s TKG has much deeper
roots. The core of the issue is whether a new transmission tech-
nology also automatically gives rise to a new market. In this case,
the European Commission maintains that VDSL is a technology
which merely enables faster access to services which have existed
for a long time. It says VDSL does not raise hopes of fundamentally
new services or fundamentally new markets being developed.
Owing to the substitution relationships with the already existing
services the European Commission sees no reason for VDSL to be
exempted from the ex-ante regulation even temporarily. Ex-ante
regulation is meant to ensure that the service providers obtain
access to the newly developing VDSL network. In hopes of pro-
moting competition and innovation in telecommunications, the EU is
counting especially on service competition.
EU directives provide scope for interpretation
The legal anchoring of the promotion of competition and innovation
has long been a major issue in the EU. In 2002, the European
Parliament adopted a package of directives put forward by the
European Commission “On competition in the markets for electronic
communications networks and services”. The package covers the
framework, authorisation, access, universal service and data pro-
tection directives and the decision on frequencies.
4 So if there is a risk of the unequal market conditions taking root over the long term,
regulatory intervention is also provided for by the amendment to Section 9a of the
TKG.
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EU counting on three instruments
The European Commission is counting on the
following three instruments in the practical
implementation phase:
1. The power of veto of the European
Commission over the national regulators:
this veto enables the Commission to
rescind the measures of the national
regulators when the relevant markets are
determined or when a dominant market
position is determined.
2. Regular audit of the measures: the national
regulator should regularly check in the
different markets to see whether ex-ante
regulation is still really needed.
3. Increasing the penalty for market abuse:
The fine for established abuse of market
clout is to be geared to the size of the
profits generated.
Member states want to rely on present
institutions
Efficiency of centralisation is
debatable
With this package, the Commission wanted to further harmonise the
legal framework in the single market, promote service providers
operating EU-wide and intensify competition in the telecom-
munications market. To do so, the regulatory framework defines the
principles of regulation within the EU. This is the basis on which the
national regulators are to define the domestic markets, for instance,
and analyse their market clout. The regulatory framework compels
the national regulators to report, as part of the consultation and
consolidation procedure (Section 12 of the TKG), to the European
Commission on the result of the analysis and the planned regulatory
measures.
EU cooks up idea of a central regulatory authority
After the hearing on the reworking of the applicable European
regulatory framework in 2006 and the publication in November 2007
of the proposals, the European Commission proposes to extend its
own right of veto to the operative national regulatory measures. This
step would significantly curtail the current decision-making powers
of the national regulatory authorities. In the meantime, the European
Commission has gone even further than calling for this extended
veto right and has demanded a supranational regulatory authority.
The EU member states reject the demand for a considerable
extension of the Commission’s power of veto to the veto on
remedies of the national regulators associated with the call for a
central European regulator. They point to the scope of remedies
already available to the existing institutions. In particular, these are
the European Regulators Group (ERG) and the Independent
Regulators Group (IRG).5 The national regulators would like the
ERG and/or the IRG to coordinate regulation in the EU. Therefore,
they demand that, instead of a new central regulatory authority
being set up, the resources and capacities of these two existing
bodies be expanded. The intensified cooperation between the
regulators is meant to ensure the consistent application of the EU’s
legal framework.
Europe needs “super” regulators, but not a super-
regulator
When assessing the various regulatory approaches it has to be
borne in mind that it was actually not until the EU installed its
regulatory framework that the national regulators started to take
account of the cross-border angle. Despite this success, though, it is
unlikely that the achievements of the past can be replicated via the
centralisation of regulation preferred by the European Commission.
It is thus highly debatable whether a central regulatory authority can
even handle the extensive tasks of the now 27 national regulators
considering the big differences in national (and even regional)
submarkets. In addition, the fundamental considerations on sub-
sidiarity6 raise doubts that a central regulatory authority would take
adequate notice of the regional specifics.
Furthermore, a central conflict facing the sector-specific regulator
arises from the regulatory mandate formulated by the policymakers.
According to the mandate, the sector-specific regulator should focus
5 The ERG is the representative body of the national regulators of the EU. By
contrast, the IRG is the representative body of the national regulators of the EU
and of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).
6 Subsidiarity is a fundamental principle of the EU. According to this principle,
decisions in this multi-state association should be made as decentrally as possible
and only as centrally as absolutely necessary.
8 July 8, 2008
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Centralisation dispenses with
“competition as a process of trial and
error”
International roaming: Long a controversial challenge
A further source of conflict besides inadequate access to the innovative fixed-line
network has meanwhile been eliminated. For years, policymakers and consumers
criticised the high fees charged for transferring mobile connections via the
networks of foreign service providers (international roaming). For a long time, much
higher fees were charged for mobile connections from abroad than for the
domestic market. This situation was economically dubious since the higher fees
were based not on the innovativeness of the network provider, but on market clout.
Even though the challenge had long been recognised, the national regulators
lacked the incentive to unilaterally clamp down on the domestic mobile providers
on their own. It was argued that such cases would only serve to improve the
standing of foreign mobile providers, but not the customers of the domestic
providers. To solve this dilemma of national regulation, the European Commission
decided to launch a concerted action for the single market and introduced the
“Euro Tariff” in mid-2007. This tariff significantly lowers the roaming fees in EU-wide
mobile telephony and thus improves the lot of all mobile customers in the EU.
Central regulator has greater
discretionary scope
all its actions on ensuring that competition develops in such a way
that regulatory interventions at regular intervals become un-
necessary. The sector-specific regulator thus has the mandate of
making itself superfluous. So the target that goes hand in hand with
the collective rationale of minimising regulatory activity is at odds
with the interests of the regulator following the individual rationale of
keeping his position. The regulator could thus interpret the dis-
cretionary scope of the complex market in such a way that sector-
specific ex-ante regulation is maintained longer than is actually
necessary. Because of the growing complexity of integration, such a
procedure should be easier for a central regulator to handle than for
a national regulator who is very much more directly confronted with
the consequences of his decisions by the market participants.7
Ultimately, centralised regulation dispenses with the option of
identifying the best strategy through competition between different
national approaches with a limited amount of risk.
Coordination does not necessarily require new
bureaucracy
These disadvantageous aspects of a central regulator should not
mislead anyone into rejecting all supranationally coordinated
regulation in the EU out of principle. In fact, coordinated regulation
may offer very good prospects depending on the market circum-
stances. Market circumstances which suggest coordinated regul-
ation is appropriate are found, for example, in international roaming
with mobile telephony. The effects of this business segment are not
confined to a single national market. The regulatory approach
geared to national borders does not go far enough in this instance.
Nevertheless, no central authority is required for such a coordinating
job. By contrast, it could be an advantage that existing coordinating
bodies such as the European Regulators Group (ERG) assume
greater responsibility here.
Ex ante, if necessary, ex post, if possible
Besides the question as to the best approach to regulation in
institutional terms, i.e. the division of competences between the
national and supranational level, the regulatory institutions discuss
7 Haucap, Justus and Jürgen Kühling (2006). Eine effiziente vertikale Verteilung der
Exekutivkompetenzen bei der Regulierung von Telekommunikationsmärkten in
Europa. In: Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, 55, 3.
10 12 14 16 18
2006
2005
2004
O2 and E-Plus
Deutsche Telekom AG and Vodafone
#
   



EUR cent
Source: Reuters, 2006 ''
* 

"  



Schematic representation of an international
call by mobile
Home country Foreign country
Source: EU Commission, 2007
Her home
network
operator
International
transfer
His host
network
operator
Other
network
operators
'3
Telecom regulation in the EU facing change of tack
July 8, 2008 9
Static approach points to drawback of
parallel infrastructures
Doubts about static approach being
voiced
Regulation model should factor in the
market dynamic
Ex-ante regulation is a strong market
intervention
Delicate decisions on appropriate
price
the key issue of when the regulator should step in, whether ex post
or ex ante.
Ex-ante regulation is correctly understood as being strong market
intervention by the regulator. In order to keep from unnecessarily
limiting market forces, the EU explicitly sets out the prerequisites for
ex-ante regulation in its regulatory framework. According to this
framework, ex-ante regulation is only necessary if the following
three prerequisites are fulfilled (three-criteria test):
1. There are substantial barriers to market entry.
2. There is no visible trend towards the development of
competition.
3. The ex-post interventions provided for in general competition
law are unable to guarantee competitive structures.
The three-criteria test is meant to help the regulator to intervene at
the right time with the right intensity in market activity. If the criteria
of this test are not all met at once, the market will be regulated ex
post in the framework of the TKG.
Efficiency becomes dynamic
To assess regulatory approaches, economic science applies the
efficiency yardstick. However, this criterion has been modified
considerably over time. Originally, economists fully supported the
concept of static efficiency. They assumed that competition in
capital-intensive network industries with parallel infrastructures could
not be efficient in general. With identical parallel networks the infra-
structure costs would rise unnecessarily. Consequently, only one
single infrastructure ought to be built up. In this situation a regulator
is required who can ensure with ex-ante intervention that all service
providers in the network industry will obtain access to the infra-
structure at an appropriate price.
Today, the static approach is criticised in many quarters as an over-
simplification. Numerous economists doubt that competition can be
described by a static model in the first place. Static efficiency looks
solely for the existence of high profits. According to the static
approach, no single market participant should ever be able to reap
high profits.
The critics look at the dynamic model with its time dimension in
juxtaposition with the static model. The dynamic efficiency approach
assumes there is a continuing process of Schumpeter’s “creative
destruction” driven by ongoing product and process innovations. In
this model, a market can be (dynamically) efficient even if a market
participant generates high profits. The condition for the dynamically
efficient situation is partly that high profits result from a company’s
innovative edge, and partly that the profits will be eaten up again in
the foreseeable future via newly arising competititve structures. In
practice, though, the challenge is to ensure that high profits are run
down fairly soon.
Need to set appropriate price
If a company earns large profits in the market, the regulator has to
determine the reason. If these profits are not attributable to
temporary innovation leadership but rather to continuing market
clout, the dynamic approach also sees the necessity of ex-ante
regulation. If a regulator decides in favour of ex-ante regulation, it
has to answer the complex question of what the appropriate price
should be. If the price is too high or too low, this weighs on the
10 July 8, 2008
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Promotion of competition
has to be balanced
Past successes must not be
interpreted falsely
various segments of the telecommunications industry. If the
regulator sets the price too high, this weighs on the service
providers. An overly high price for the use of infrastructure lowers
the attractiveness of developing new services and thus curbs the
growth of the market for telecommunications services. If, however,
the regulator sets the price of infrastructure use too low, this weighs
on the competing infrastructure providers. As the price falls, so does
the appeal of investments in infrastructure. Too low a price for the
use of the infrastructure thus jeopardises its expansion and techno-
logical upgrading. If ex-ante regulation fails to take due account of
investment risk by charging risk-adjusted fees, for instance, and
instead focuses unilaterally on low end-consumer prices, this may
cripple the innovativeness of the telecommunications industry.
Caught between promoting service competition and promoting
infrastructure competition, the regulator faces an ongoing learning
process that requires prudent action founded on a clear basis.
Regulation requires clear policy objectives
The EU telecommunications industry has made considerable pro-
gress since sector-specific regulation was introduced. However, the
process of telecoms liberalisation still has a long way to go. Com-
petition has to develop further in the EU. Since service competition
depends directly on the price of access to infrastructure, the pre-
requisite for competition without regulatory intervention on services
at regular intervals is competition on the communications infra-
structure. Without alternative infrastructure for communications,
regular intervention by the policymakers will remain a necessity.
Policymakers must therefore link promotion of service competition
with promotion of infrastructure competition in order to actually
achieve a liberalised telecommunications market.
In the current conflict between the European Commission and the
German government, the matter at issue is how centralised the
coordination of regulation should be. In this context, supranationally
coordinated regulation no doubt extends the national regulatory
approaches to include the cross-border aspect. This is all the more
important insofar as technological convergence and integration of
the international markets are blurring the once clear dividing lines in
telecommunications. In fact, the EU regulatory framework has
noticeably boosted progress in European telecommunications.
However, it would be premature to say that this points to the
necessity of further centralising the job of regulation at the level of
the European Commission. The proposal to set up a central
European regulator thus contains two major drawbacks: (1) the
looming tussle among the various regulatory bodies would cause
time lags and uncertainties in the market; and (2) the geographical
distance and the distance as regards content between a central
regulator and the national submarkets could weigh on the quality of
decision-making.
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Reliability promotes competition The debate on the new scenario facing European telecoms
regulators shows that as far as the institutional (centralised or
decentralised) and time-related (ex-post or ex-ante) focus is
concerned, a clear policy line is required. Politically motivated
delays and ensuing market uncertainties must be avoided. This is
the only way to boost innovation and thus achieve competition in the
telecommunications industry without regulatory intervention at
regular intervals.
Stefan Heng (+49 69 910-31774, stefan.heng@db.com)8
8 I should like to thank Dr. Annegret Groebel, Manuel Kallies, Dr. Peter Knauth,
Frank Krüger and Dr. Klaus Winkler for their invaluable commentary and pointers.
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